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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN WEST VIRGINIA-BOYD,
MCABOY, AND CANNELLAS
In the past year, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
has been noticeably active in the area of criminal procedure. In
dealing with a variety of evidentiary and constitutional issues, the
court has consistently taken a position which provides almost zeal-
ous protection to the criminal defendant. Such a protective posi-
tion is most apparent not only in the court's reaffirmation of histor-
ical safeguards, but also in the court's extension of these safe-
guards. Basically, the court has exhibited an increased willingness
to closely examine trial records, to utilize broad judicial review,
and to overrule previous decisions where necessary in order to pro-
mote a strict protection of the accused's rights. An analysis of the
major cases and their impact on the court's previous position re-
veals the extent to which the court has afforded greater protections
to the criminal defendant in the past year.
One of the first evidentiary issues addressed by the court was
a criminal defendant's impeachment at trial. In State v. Boyd, 1 the
defendant argued on appeal that his constitutional rights were
violated when impeachment using pretrial silence was permitted
at trial. In that case, after the defendant had surrendered, he ad-
mitted that he had shot and killed the victim, and he volunteered
the location of the murder weapon. At that time, he gave no other
information. At trial, for the first time, he claimed self-defense.
The prosecutor then attempted to impeach the defendant by ques-
tioning him about why he had not revealed the self-defense story
to the police. Defense counsel objected, but the trial judge over-
ruled and instead gave the jury an instruction indicating that the
defendant was not required to make a statement to the police. On
appeal, the court found that it was reversible error to allow the
prosecution to cross-examine the defendant about his pretrial si-
lence or to comment on that silence before the jury.
The Boyd court was careful to point out that even though
reference during trial to the defendant's pretrial silence is prohib-
ited, the defendant may still be impeached by use of voluntary
pretrial inconsistent statements. The opinion goes further, how-
ever, to state that before any such prior inconsistent statement
may be used for impeachment, the trial court must conduct an in
1 233 S.E.2d 710 (W. Va. 1975).
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camera hearing, with the defendant present, to determine the vol-
untariness of such statement. The hearing must be conducted sua
sponte if necessary. This holding reflects a new and stronger pro-
tective position than that previously taken by the court.
In 1962, in State v. Stevenson,2 the court held that the trial
court must determine voluntariness of a pretrial confession. If the
defendant denies making the prior statement, a question of fact
arises which is to be submitted to the jury for consideration. Under
Stevenson, the trial judge was not required to determine by prelim-
inary examination whether the confession was voluntarily made.
Four years later, this inconsistency was clarified somewhat in
State v. Fortner,I when the West Virginia Supreme Court clearly
held that it was the duty of the trial court to conduct a hearing,
sua sponte if necessary, to determine voluntariness prior to admis-
sion of any confession, and that failure to do so was reversible error.
Boyd extends this rationale to any inconsistent statement,
and further requires that where such statement is admissible to
impeach the criminal defendant, but covers only part of the rele-
vant information, it is error to permit the prosecution to force the
accused to acknowledge or justify his pre-trial silence in any area
where he has made no statement at all.' Under the Boyd approach,
the trial court must maintain close control of the cross-
examination of any defendant who has made no pre-trial state-
ment or has made only limited admissions, in order to insure that
the prosecutor's tactics will not result in any reference to the defen-
dant's pre-trial silence or involuntary statements.
Another issue relating to impeachment of a criminal defen-
dant at trial arose in State v. McA boy.5 The defendant in the case
appealed his murder conviction on the grounds that it was imper-
missible to allow the prosecution to impeach him at trial by use of
a prior felony conviction. The court found that only convictions for
perjury and false swearing are admissible for impeachment pur-
poses because these are the only crimes which directly relate to the
2 147 W. Va. 211, 127 S.E.2d 638 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 938 (1962).
3 150 W. Va. 571, 148 S.E.2d 669 (1969).
'This is clearly a departure from the position taken by the United States
Supreme Court in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), and Oregon v. Hass,
420 U.S. 714 (1975). These cases allow impeachment of the defendant's credibility
by use of prior inconsistent statements obtained in violation of Miranda procedures,
without consideration of the voluntariness of such statement, on the theory that
Miranda should not be allowed to promote perjury.
5 236 S.E.2d 431 (W. Va. 1977).
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defendant's credibility. As a result of McA boy, West Virginia has
declared a policy, based on constitutional protections, which is
among the most restrictive in the nation.
The original position taken by West Virginia on this issue was
best stated in State v. White,8 where the court found that
"impeaching evidence must be confined to reputation for truth,
and does not embrace moral character in general. Therefore, evi-
dence of the commission of other crimes is not admissible as im-
peaching testimony."7 The underlying rationale for such a prohibi-
tion was that the jury would consider the revelation of other con-
victions as an indication of guilt in the case at hand. West Virginia
subsequently began to carve out exceptions to the White rule and
seemed to adopt an ad hoc balancing test which allowed the use
of a greater variety of prior convictions for impeachment purposes.8
This position was more clearly adopted in State v. Friedman,'
which interpreted a state statute10 to allow the use of prior convic-
tions to impeach the defendant when he took the stand. The argu-
ment was that by voluntarily becoming a witness, the defendant
opened up cross-examination to include any area. The defendant's
only safeguard was to request a limiting instruction explaining to
the jury that the former convictions brought out on such cross-
examination related only to the question of credibility, and not to
the question of guilt. The Friedman court noted, however, that the
trial court was not required to give such an instruction sua sponte.
Over thirty years after the Friedman decision, in State v.
McGee," the court adopted a stricter approach to the use of prior
convictions for impeachment. In the language of the court, the
"trial court is required to consider the probative value of such a
81 W. Va. 516, 94 S.E. 972 (1918).
Id. at 521, 94 S.E. at 974.
See generally State v. Woods, 155 W. Va. 344, 184 S.E.2d 130 (1971); State
v. LaRosa, 129 W. Va. 634, 41 S.E.2d 121 (1946); State v. McMillion, 127 W. Va.
197, 32 S.E.2d 625 (1944); State v. Friedman, 124 W. Va. 4, 18 S.E.2d 653 (1942).
* 124 W. Va. 2, 18 S.E.2d 653 (1942).
l' W. VA. CODE § 57-3-6 (1966).
At any trial. . . for a felony or misdemeanor, the accused shall, with his
consent. . . be a competent witness. . . and if he so voluntarily becomes
a witness he shall, as to all matters relevant to the issue, be deemed to
have waived his privilege of not giving evidence against himself, and shall
be subject to cross-examination as any other witness, but his failure to
testify shall create no presumption against him nor be the subject of any
comment before the court or jury by anyone.
1, 230 S.E.2d 832 (W. Va. 1976).
[Vol. 80
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line of questioning measured against the risk of substantial danger
of undue prejudice to the accused."12 If no risk of substantial dan-
ger is found, then the former conviction may be admitted into
evidence, but the trial court must then be given an explanatory,
limiting instruction.
-The McAboy court, then, has restricted the use of prior con-
victions even further, for only convictions for perjury and false
swearing may be introduced on the issue of credibility, unless the
defendant affirmatively places his good character in issue. Once he
places his character in issue, the McGee balancing test is applica-
ble to determine whether other types of prior convictions are ad-
missible.
The second major issue addressed by the court in the past year
involves the criminal defendant's constitutional right to presence.
In State v. Boyd,"3 during defense counsel's closing argument, an
objection was raised by the prosecution. The objection was fol-
lowed by an off-the-record, in camera hearing between the trial
judge and the attorneys, without the defendant's presence. In line
with strict protection of the defendant's rights, the holding in the
case was that such an in camera conference was a stage of the
proceeding at which the defendant's presence was constitutionally
required. The opinion goes on to resolve two ambiguities in this
area of the law.
The first ambiguity involves a question of what stages of a
criminal proceeding require the defendant's presence. Prior to
1938, West Virginia generally recognized a defendant's right to
presence," and in that year, in State v. Martin,15 interpreted sec-
tions of the West Virginia Code" to mean that the defendant must
be present at all stages of the trial affecting him, and that such
presence must appear in the record. That decision left open, how-
ever, the determination of which stages affected the defendant's
rights sufficiently to require his presence. This question remained
unanswered through 1958, though the court resolved at least some
11 Id. at 837.
13 233 S.E.2d 710 (W. Va. 1977).
" State v. Snider, 81 W. Va. 522, 94 S.E. 981 (1918) (motion to strike evi-
dence); State v. Grove, 74 W. Va. 702, 82 S.E. 1019 (1914) (post trial argument for
new trial); State v. Sutter, 71 W. Va. 371, 76 S.E. 811 (1912) (when motion was
argued).
" 120 W. Va. 229, 197 S.E. 727 (1938).
" W. VA. CODE § 62-3-2 (1977 Replacement Vol.). "A person indicted for felony
shall be personally present during the trial therefor."
4
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of the ambiguities when it held that the defendant need not be
present when a matter not part of the criminal trial itself and
which could not affect any of his rights was being considered."
Again, however, the court did not sufficiently define which parts
of the proceedings could be carried on without affecting the defen-
dant's rights. The Boyd court defined a critical stage as one where
the defendant's right to a fair trial will be affected. "Generally, all
matters starting with the commencement of the actual trial require
the presence of the accused through final judgment."' 8 Pretrial
ministerial matters, such as consultations between prosecution
and defense counsel, routine orders filing motions, or clerical mat-
ters, however, are specifically excluded. The in camera evidentiary
hearing in Boyd occurred during the trial and so was a critical
stage requiring presence of the defendant.
The second ambiguity concerns the effect of the harmless error
rule on the defendant's right to be present. In State v. Thomas,"
the court found that where harmless error was applicable, the bur-
den was on the state to show that any error resulting from the
violation of the defendant's rights was harmless beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. Thomas, however, did not specifically hold that the
harmless error doctrine applied to rights created in the West Vir-
ginia Constitution. In State ex rel Grob v. Blair,"' the court went
on to find that the right to presence was both constitutional and
statutory in nature, but was subject to the harmless error rule. The
case thus extended Thomas to the right to presence created by the
West Virginia Constitution. The harmless error test actually set
forth by the Grob court, however, differed from the Thomas test,
for the Grob court shifted the burden to the defendant to
"demonstrate a possibility of prejudice" in order to show that the
harmless error test was not applicable."' The Boyd court clearly
reaffirmed the position taken in Thomas and placed the burden
back on the state to prove that there was harmless error in the
constitutional violation. Furthermore, such harmless error can
only be proven if a sufficient record of all the proceedings is pre-
served. Because there was no record of the in camera hearing in
" State ex rel Burkhamer v. Adams, 143 W. Va. 557, 103 S.E.2d 777, cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 869 (1958) (defendant not present in court when matter of fees to
be paid to examining physician was considered).
" 233 S.E.2d at 719.
" 203 S.E.2d 445 (W. Va. 1974).
20 214 S.E.2d 330 (W. Va. 1974).
21 Id. at 337.
[Vol. 80
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Boyd, the state was conclusively unable to prove harmless error in
the violation of the defendant's constitutional right to be present.
The final major area in which the recent court extended pro-
tections to the criminal defendant is the area of a defendant's
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Though West
Virginia has long recognized a criminal defendant's right to effec-
tive counsel, the court has traditionally applied the "mockery of
justice" test to determine such effectiveness." In other words, as-
sistance of counsel was deemed effective absent a gross miscarriage
of justice. In 1974, in State v. Thomas, 3 this position was modified,
for the court adopted "the normal and customary skill test." Under
this test, the court undertook a closer review of defense counsel's
actions and balanced them against those expected of an attorney
reasonably competent in the conduct of a criminal trial. Shortly
thereafter, the court began to set out specific instances in which
counsel would be deemed ineffective, 4 such as failure to properly
prepare for trial or failure to prosecute a timely appeal. During the
same period, however, in Carter v. Bordenkircher,21 the court reaf-
firmed its position that not every error made by counsel would
render the assistance ineffective. Counsel cannot be required to
explore every possible defense, and tactics used during trial should
not be open to "second guessing" upon review. These decisions set
forth general guidelines for a determination of effectiveness of
counsel, and specifically left control of the tactical aspects of the
case in the hands of the individual defense attorney.
In Cannellas v. McKenzie,2 the court adopted a stricter re-
view of the effectiveness of defense counsel. In that case, the defen-
dant was convicted of rape. After raising the defense of consent at
trial, counsel for the defendant apparently made the tactical deci-
sion to attack the credibility of the prosecutrix as the major thrust
of the defense. On appeal, the court took the unprecedented step
of declaring that specific acts of the defense counsel constituted
ineffective assistance, even though such acts could ordinarily be
I State ex rel Blankenship v. Boles, 149 W. Va. 377, 141 S.E.2a 68 (1965); W.
VA. CONST. art. Hm, § 14. See Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); State ex
rel Duncan v. Boles, 149 W. Va. 334, 140 S.E.2d 798 (1965).
203 S.E.2d 445 (W. Va. 1974).
24 See generally State ex rel Owens v. King, 149 W. Va. 637, 142 S.E.2d 880
(1965); State ex rel Robison v. Boles, 149 W. Va. 516, 142 S.E.2d 55 (1965); State
ex rel Favors v. Tucker, 143 W. Va. 130, 100 S.E.2d 411 (1957), cert. denied, 357
U.S. 908 (1958).
" 226 S.E.2d 711 (W. Va. 1976).
- 236 S.E.2d 327 (W. Va. 1977).
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classed as "tactical decisions." Furthermore, the decision reveals
a willingness to use broad judicial review to extract specific instan-
ces of conduct from the record which could be thought to be inef-
fective, even though those instances were not raised on appeal.
Assistance was found to be ineffective, for instance, because
counsel failed to question prospective jurors on voir dire
examination regarding a prejudicial newspaper article. The deci-
sion regarding questioning of these jurors would seem to be a judg-
ment call to be made by counsel and would depend upon his evalu-
ation of the impact of the news article versus the impact created
by putting the article in issue on voir dire. If the publicity was not
thought to be prejudicial or was circulated on a limited basis,
questioning prosepctive jurors on their attitudes toward the article
might only serve to clarify the negative aspects in their minds."
In light of the fact that jurors have been seated under conditions
far more prejudicial than casual exposure to a questionable arti-
cle,21 a rule requiring voir dire examination of this point would
seem overly mechanical since jurors will likely be seated unless
they clearly indicate that the adverse publicity actually had a
prejudicial effect.2 19
An equally difficult question may arise regarding the
Cannellas court's holding that failure to assign insufficiency of
evidence as grounds for appeal constitutes ineffective assistance of
counsel. While West Virginia originally held that the jury verdict
in a criminal trial would not be set aside unless it was manifestly
against the weight of the evidence," this test has been modified
periodically. A later interpretation of the rule held that the verdict
would not be set aside where reasonable men could differ as to the
verdict, unless it was clearly wrong or had no evidence to support
it.' As a corollary, the court held that the appellate court can not
invade the province of the jury unless the evidence upon which the
verdict is based is patently incredible, since the appellate court
does not have the benefit of viewing the demeanor of the witness.32
I. Owin, DEFENDING CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE JUmES, 117-20 (1973).
" State v. Taft, 143 W. Va. 365, 102 S.E.2d 152 (1958). In Taft, prospective
jurors present in court as spectators during the trial of defendant, who was charged
with unlawful transportation of intoxicating liquors, were permitted to be seated
as jurors in a second trial of the same defendant on drunk driving charges.
" Id. (by implication).
n State v. Toler, 129 W. Va. 575, 41 S.E.2d 850 (1946).
3, State v. Voiers, 134 W. Va. 690, 61 S.E.2d 521 (1950).
3 State v. Bailey, 151 W. Va. 796, 155 S.E.2d 850 (1967).
[Vol. 80
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The current position would allow the verdict to stand if there is
substantial evidence upon which the jury might have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
In Cannellas, however, the court made a determination that
the clothing worn by the victim was critical to the state's case and
then determined that without this evidence there would have been
insufficient grounds for conviction." Defense counsel chose not to
challenge the admission of the clothing, but instead produced a
witness, the prosecutrix's companion on the night of the rape, to
testify about inconsistent statements regarding the clothing which
were made by the prosecutrix at the preliminary hearing. Since the
testimony of the proxecutrix, her companion, and her mother (an-
other witness) would seem to supply sufficient basis for a convic-
tion under the current test even without the clothing, it would
seem incongruous to require counsel to base his appeal on insuffi-
cient evidence where oral evidence and demeanor of the various
witnesses is the deciding factor. While the prior position was based
on a determination that the appellate court should not pass upon
the sufficiency of evidence without benefit of viewing the de-
meanor of trial witnesses, Cannellas seems to institute broad re-
view of the evidence based solely on the record of trial proceedings,
whether or not the insufficiency issue is raised on appeal. Though
the decision is a clear attempt to protect the criminal defendant
from incompetent counsel, the result may be to force all defense
attorneys to assign insufficiency of evidence as grounds for appeal
in order to protect not the defendant, but themselves. Further-
more, the court may now take on the burden of reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence in all cases without the benefit of view-
ing the demeanor of witnesses." This is perhaps the most outstand-
ing aspect of the case.
The Cannellas court also held that it was improper for defense
counsel to introduce evidence that the defendant was a married
man. Since consideration of a defendant's marital status has been
allowed where no objection is made," it seems unduly harsh to
disallow introduction of this fact by the defense to demonstrate
lack of motive. The effect of the holding will be to prevent attor-
neys from presenting this potentially helpful evidence as a portion
of the rape defense.
State v. West, 153 W. Va. 325, 168 S.E.2d 716 (1969).
236 S.E.2d 327 (W. Va. 1977) (by implication).
Id. (by implication).
26 See State v. Beacraft, 126 W. Va. 895, 30 S.E.2d 541 (1944).
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In Cannellas, then, the court set up specific procedures which
must be followed by all defense counsel in areas considered
"tactical" under Thomas, and in so doing moved away from the
"reasonable skill" test set out by Thomas. The court has, in effect,
begun to invade the province of the defense attorney to decide
tactical matters. Although the court made it clear that the decision
to regard defense counsel as ineffective in this case was made not
on the basis of a single act, but rather on the cumulative effect of
the attorney's decisions, it will be difficult for appointed counsel
to avoid the conclusion that he must affirmatively comply with the
specific suggestions of the court, or be found ineffective.
As a result of Boyd, McA boy, and Cannellas, the current focus
of the court seems to be on extension of protection to the criminal
defendant. While this trend could continue, prediction of the
court's future position on any given issue is difficult because the
dissents in each of the cases indicate that there is some dissatisfac-
tion with such a judicial undertaking. For example, it seems clear
from Cannellas that the court intends to carefully review the con-
duct of defense counsel to protect the accused from infractions in
what the court sees as a minimum standard of conduct. The dis-
senting justice in that case, however, would have found the assis-
tance of defense counsel effective and thus would have properly
applied the spirit of Thomas. He argued that each of the decisions
made by defense counsel was tactical and hence not properly sub-
ject to review.
Despite the uncertainty in prediction, the criminal decisions,
as well as the recent mandates of the legislature requiring counsel
in quasi-criminal actions such as child neglect 7 and juvenile hear-
ings,3" seem to indicate that the court can be expected to offer
further protection to classes of civil litigants. While this protec-
tion will probably not take the form of reversal of civil cases where
a review of the record demonstrates a lack of fundamental fairness
due to ineffective counsel, it will likely be extended through a more
active disciplinary review of the actions of civil counsel.'" Since the
3 W. VA. CODE § 49-6-2 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
*' W. VA. CODE § 49-5-8 to -9 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
See generally Wheeling Dollar Say. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499 (W. Va. 1977)
(overruling prior cases which interpreted West Virginia law to exclude adopted
children from a share of the proceeds of inter vivos trusts).
11 See generally Comm. on Legal Ethics of W. Va. State Bar v. Pence, 240
S.E.2d 668 (W. Va. 1977); Comm. on Legal Ethics of W. Va. State Bar v. Jones,
239 S.E.2d 133 (W. Va. 1977); Comm. on Legal Ethics of W. Va. State Bar v.
Daniel, 235 S.E.2d 369 (W. Va. 1977).
[Vol. 80
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basic philosophy of the court may be reflected in other civil cases
as well, the court is likely to place a greater emphasis on the rights
of injured plaintiffs in the area of negligence and products liabil-
ity.41
The court will probably continue to take a generally broad
approach in all areas, while retaining the power to decide some
cases on narrow grounds, and will consistently employ a very broad
scope of judicial review in its efforts to insure fairness. For this
reason, the court may appear to fluctuate in its approach to consti-
tutional and other issues from time to time, but will continue
expansion of protection of individual rights.
Joseph M. Price
" Dawson v. Canteen Corp., 212 S.E.2d 82 (W. Va. 1975).
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